INTRODUCTION
Suppose A has a claim against B ("^ v 5"). B has a claim over against C ("5 v C) .' B, however, is insolvent and has not actually paid A. B's, chief asset is, in fact, BvC. To what extent can C claim that B v C is valueless-^that B was not damaged because B is too broke to pay A1 This question raises the fundamental legal distinction between indemnity and liability. If C has a duty to indemnify, C's duty is strictly contingent on 5's actual, historic payment of If C is liable to B, then ^ V 5 is an element of the damages C owes B'mBv C?
The distinction between indemnity and liability becomes important whenever B is insolvent. ^ And it is precisely here that the distinction is beginning to break down. The harbinger of meltdown is Feldman v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corpf where B had a contribution right against C. Contribution is like indemnity, in that the right is contingent on B actually paying A} In Feldman, B could not afford to pay^.
In order to snatch from C the ignoble cover of 5's insolvency. A's lawyer {X) lent the amount oi A v B to B. In exchange, B issued a promissory note to X and assigned the proceeds of .5 v C as collateral. Newly solvent (or at least liquid), B paid A by check. A guaranteed X that X would be paid from the proceeds of 5 v C. As collateral for ^'s suretyship obligation, A pledged to X the check B had written to in satisfaction of ^ v B. The pledge was accomplished by ^'s deposit of 5's eheck in ^s fiduciary account. Assuming A's bank was the only bank involved in the transaction,^ then no funds changed hands ever. The whole transaction was financially meaningless. Neither the bank, X or B ever surrendered control of any capital. ' Nevertheless, the Feldman court held that A was "paid." A's payment vested B with a contribution right against C. C therefore had to pay contribution to B, even though B was hopelessly insolvent before the loan fi-om X. C's payment reimbursed X, which released Xs security interest in the fUnds used to pay A. Through the magic of secured lending, indemnity was transformed into liability.
In this article, I argue for the "legal realist" position that, after Feldman, the distinction between indemnity and liability is, or ought to be, erased in any case where B is insolvent. If the courts can authorize the Feldman ploy, they can generally declare that A is already deemed paid whenever B has any kind of theory against C for either indemnity or liability, provided that a mechanism is in place for A actually to receive the proceeds of B v C. In effect, A has a security interest in .5 v C as a matter of law. No matter what 5's theory is against C, this relation should guarantee that C ean never benefit from 5's insolvency.
This solution answers a contradiction that otherwise exists in 5's bankruptcy proceeding. The current view is that, in ^4 v 5, ^ is but an unsecured creditor in 5's bankruptcy. As such, A has only a pro rata claim against 5's bankruptcy estate.^ IfBv C depends on v4's payment or assurance of future payment, a certain infinite regress is generated that absolves C from paying. Suppose A claims $100 from B, but B is paying only 10 cents on the dollar in her bankruptcy. This implies that A will obtain only $10, which means that 5 v C is only for $10. Yet if C pays the $10, ^ will receive only $1 of this amount. This in tum implies that 5's cause of action against C is worth only $1. An infinite regress benefits C, until C's obligation to B approaches (but never reaches) zero.
All this changes if the law recognizes A as 5's secured creditor, claiming 5 v C as collateral. In such a case, C must pay B $100, but these $100 are y4's cash collateral. A therefore ultimately receives $100 from C via the mediation of B. Being fully paid, A departs from 5's bankruptcy proceeding. 5's other creditors are benefited by this, since fewer creditors remain to share the existing bankruptcy estate of B. The only one who loses out is C-as is appropriate. C should not obtain a ® This is not entirely clear from the Feldman opinion, but most likely appears to be the case. 1 This ritual was first suggested in Richard T. Farrell, Civil Practice, 29 SYRACUSE L. REV.
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windfall just because his victim is broke. Indeed, in many cases, it will be C's wrongful action that caused 5's insolvency in the first place. C should not be able to benefit just because her villainy was thoroughly devastating. The situation is rather like ancient tort law in which a defendant who severely injured the plaintiff had to pay, but the defendant who killed the plaintiff was off the hook. Wrongful death statutes were generated precisely to address this anomaly. Something similar is called for in the indemnity cases where the indemnitee is insolvent. C ought to be made to pay the full scope of her liability to B-^whether B survives or succumbs financially. This paper explores the possibility, given the current law, for courts to declare the distinction between indemnity and liability to be erased in the face of the pure possibility that B can always effect a secured transaction, where B v C is the collateral. In light of this possibility, A should actually be deemed a secured creditor in 5's bankruptcy.
Any such exploration requires an examination of the legal premises of B V C. There are two theories relative to B v C. (1) C is an insurer and B is the insured. Pursuant to an express or implied contract, C is liable to or has a duty to indemnify B for A v B. (2) C has committed a tort against or breached a contract with B. A v B is then an incident of 5's consequential damages.
This article considers these two theories in turn, to assess the effect of B's insolvency, and the doctrinal possibility that A can be a secured creditor in B's bankruptcy proceeding, where .8 v C is yf's collateral.
I. INDEMNITY

A. Liability Policies Compared
Suppose B wants to buy insurance from C. B and C benefit jointly if they agree that C does not have to pay B to cover yf's liability where B is broke. From 8's perspective, if B is broke and C must nevertheless pay, only A captures the benefit of the insurance. If B has no net worth to protect, what cares 8 if ^ is never paid? (We assume here a certain hardness of spirit in 8.) Meanwhile, C's exposure is reduced, and for this C can afford to offer 8 a lower insurance premium. Such a deal, trafficking in ^f's misfortune, is called an "indemnity" or "pay first" policy,^ because C need not pay 8 until 8 presents evidence that 8 has already paid A. Where 8 cannot pay, C is off the hook. Indemnity policies are motivated specifically by the financial incentive of C to hide like a coward behind the insolvency of 5.'" Many states have intervened legislatively to prevent C from offering indemnity insurance. Aecording to New York Insurance Law section 3420:
(a) No policy . . . insuring against liability for injury to person [or] property shall be issued or delivered in this state, unless it contains in substance the following provisions or provisions which are equally or more favorable to the insured and to judgment creditors so far as such provisions relate to judgment creditors:
(1) A provision that the insolvency or bankmptcy of the person insured. . . shall not release the insurer from the payment of damages for injury sustained or loss oecasioned during the life of and within the eoverage of such policy or contract.
(2) A provision that in case judgment against the insured... shall remain unsatisfied at the expiration of thirty days from the serving of notice of entry of judgment upon the attorney for the insured, or upon the insured, and upon the insurer, then an action may... be maintained against the insurer... for the amount of such judgment not exceeding the amount of the applieable limit of coverage under sueh poliey or contract." In American Bank & Trust Co. v. Davis (In re F.O. Baroff Co.) ,^^ the court interpreted these provisions to mean that A was a secured creditor in 5's bankruptcy. In Baroff, C owed $100,000 under a policy. 5's bankruptcy trustee, having already paid A $93,621, asserted the right to take this amount from the insurance proceeds and add it to the bankruptcy estate. The Baroff court, however, ruled that, since A's unsecured deficit exceeded $100,000, the entire policy should go to In short, A was a secured creditor in B's bankruptcy for the amount of the insurance policy. The above-quoted statute, the court ruled:
was intended by the Legislature to mitigate the effects of an insured person's bankruptcy on those to whom the insured has liability within the scope of the policy, by creating in effect a trust fund of the insurance proceeds for the benefit of the injured person. Therefore, [A] acquired rights in the policy superior to [5's]...."
Economists might be tempted to say here that an indemnity policy cuts out "free riders" like A who wish to capture the benefits of B's insurance. Or, altematively, they might say that indemnity policies facilitate the externalities B imposes on the public by imdercapitalization. Or, still altematively, economists might point out that A v B is based on jury awards which have nothing at all to do with the tme cost of.4's injury, so that no scientific prediction of social policy is possible in this (or any other) legal arena. Proof of ^'s status as a secured creditor was the fact that New York gives A a direct right of action against C when C insures against the personal liability of B\ By giving the injured person a direct action against the insurer, section [3420(a)(2)] clearly demonstrates that the fundamental policy underlying the statute is that injured claimants be protected against their injurers' bankruptcies; had the Legislature's concern been focused solely on the avoidance of windfalls by insurance companies, it could have provided merely that the proceeds of the insurance policy accrue to the bankrupt's estate. Moreover, section [3420(a)(2)] contains no suggestion that the Legislature intended the injured person's right of direct recovery from the insurance company to depend on whether the insured had also suffered loss in the transactions in question. Therefore, section [3420(a) 17 Directors' and officers' (D&O) insurance stands on a different footing. Typically, B is the director and C is her insurance company. A is often the company of which B is director, and it is A that is the bankrupt. C has promised to cover B's liabilities, which means that, if A has a claim against B, A has a direct action against C. But C has likewise promised to pay B's legal expenses in ^ V B, and these expenses reduce the amount of insurance A can get. By now it has become standard practice for bankruptcy courts to help A pursue C on 5's insurance, in spite of some apparent obstacles in the Bankruptcy Code. For example, New York and many states require A to obtain a judgment against 5 as a condition precedent to the pursuit of C directly.The bankruptcy courts have found a way to permit A to obtain a judgment against B even though B has technically been discharged.
Here is how 5's discharge can be evaded to assure that C actually pays A. Bankruptcy Code § 524(a) describes the meaning of discharge. One of the principal effects is that an injunction exists against A v B. But this injunction can be lifted, if equity requires. The court in Hendrix v. Page (In re Hendrix)}'^ for example, suggested that, at any time after discharge, A can return to bankruptcy court, long after a case is closed, to apply for modification of the injunction.^o Even more striking, the Hendrix court invited state courts to ignore the injunction under § 524(a) in awarding a judgment mAv B. Naturally, the bargain is that the discharge is waived only to permit the technical judgment to be entered. B, who is discharged, never has to pay anything in terms of liability or even defense costs.^' The bankruptcy court simply aids A in pursuing C directly.22 This ad hoc system works well enough when A is the only creditor of B with rights against C, and where multiple ^s are not pursuing C's policy obligation to B. This is the era of mass torts, however, and it is now the custom for insurance proceeds to run out before the As are fully paid. Courts have improvised here, too. While the basic rule from state law is the "rustic"" one of "first come first served,"" even state courts have found occasion to impose pro rata sharing on a surfeit of As, in certain circumstances. In particular, where numerous As join in a law suit against C, and where the claims exceed B v C, courts have ordered pro rata sharing.^^ Given this instinct at state law, it has proved an easy thing for the bankruptcy courts to institute pro rata sharing among the Accordingly, bankruptcy courts have taken charge of the insurance proceeds from C, labeling it property of the estate,^'' and have administered this fund on behalf of a subset of B's creditors who are covered by this policyAlthough courts have not yet articulated the ground on which bankruptcy should administer a special fund for the benefit of only a subset of 5's creditors, such ground can easily be located in Bankruptcy Code § 725. Section 725 is the all-important provision which states that secured creditors are entitled to receive collateral before the unsecured creditors receive distributions of the bankruptcy estate. According to § 725:
After the commencement of a case under this chapter, but before final distribution of property of the estate under section 726 of this title, the tmstee, after notice and a hearing, shall dispose of any property in which an entity other than the estate has an interest, such as a lien, and that has not been disposed of under another section of this title.
If all the As claiming insurance proceeds from C are conceived as secured creditors of B, then § 725 comfortably applies to justify bankruptcy administration of insurance proceeds. That they should share pro rata, however, is not established in § 725, but can be borrowed from existing state law instincts.
The Johns-Manville case has been prominent in establishing the power of a bankruptcy court to administer insurance proceeds. In MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp.P the Second Circuit approved of a plan whereby insurance proceeds, plus other contributions, were given to a trust for distribution to all the As who were covered by the C's insurance policies. The bankruptcy court then issued an injunction barring any A from suing C. This injunction has proved controversial, and it is sometimes denounced as an overreaching attempt to give C a discharge out of B's bankruptcy.^" Yet, once it is recognized that insurance proceeds are simply collateral for ^'s security interest in B's bankruptcy, Manville injunctions do not seem controversial at all. The automatic stay itself should protect C and C's proceeds, since these proceeds are property of the bankruptcy estate. The Manville injunction also included a declaration that C's payment exhausted C's liability to B and hence to any A, but there is nothing extraordinary about this. Whenever B has a payment intangible on which a creditor claims a lien, it can be expected that B's bankruptcy trustee and the account debtor {€) might settle on a payment extinguishing the account. 
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. Why should they be prevented from bringing these actions, since they did not affect property of the estate?
Of course, § 725 is a chapter 7 rule only, not a chapter 11 rule. Nevertheless, it applies indirectly in chapter 11 cases. At least when a plan is actually confirmed, it must give every creditor at least what she would have received in chapter IP This provision in effect incorporates § 725 by reference. A harder case posed by the popular practice of conducting asset sales pursuant to § 363(b), even though no chapter 11 plan is in the offing.^'' Such cases may never culminate in a confirmed plan. Nor is it clear that they are headed for chapter 7. Nevertheless, in both chapter 11 and chapter 7, § 725 is ineluctable, and courts have had no trouble finding the authority to split up C's insurance proceeds equally among all the ^s.^^ Baroff stands for the proposition that is a secured creditor of B with a claim onBv C. Does this mean that, when A obtains a judgment against B shortly before 5's bankruptcy, A has received a voidable preference? Apparently not, by ancient fiat of the Supreme Court, which, without sharing its analysis, simply declared the scheme to be consistent with bankruptcy law.^® But this point can be explained by the fact that 
(2002) (arguing this has become the true function of chapter 11).
35 In Johns-Manville, B obtained proceeds from C and purported to "sell" them to a trustee in exchange for the trustee's promise to distribute the proceeds equally among the As. 837 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1988). In other words, an assigmnent for the benefit of creditors was arranged in the middle of a chapter 11 proceeding. The court ruled that the proceeds were disposed of pursuant to § 363(f)(4), which permits sale of debtor assets free and clear of adverse interests if the adverse interests are in bona fide dispute. Id. When this is done, the bankruptcy court retains jiuisdiction to decide the dispute. Of course, if the imderlying rule is pro rata sharing, there is no real bona fide dispute as a matter of law, but there still might be as a factual matter, as the size of any one claim by A affects the security interest of any other A. In any case, the Johns-Manville court saw no jurisdictional impediment to administering the insurance proceeds on behalf of a surfeit of .4s. proposition for any A who did not already have a judgment against B by the time of the bankruptcy petition. This implies that those with judgments against B (Aj) by the time of bankruptcy do have security interests already and are entitled to adequate protection of them'" against subsequent inroads by other As. At least one court has already found entitled to postpetition interest accruing against B v C.'^^ This in turn implies ^j's right to adequate protection against the appearances of yet other postpetition As, who might crowd y4j's claim against the insurance proceeds.
There is probably no way to fit Aj into a coherent doctrinal vision. Courts will probably just ad hoc it and declare that, whereas Aj must have a judgment against B to perfect a direct action against C, Aj shares with all the other As who have no judgments, whenever B is bankrupt.
B. Indemnity Policies
Not all insurance contracts fall under the regulations described above. For example, in maritime insurance written under New York law,''^ C is permitted to write a "pay first" policy in which C is liable to A if and only if 5 has already paid A.'^ "Pay first" policies allow C to hide behind the insolvency of B and avoid paying on the policy for the benefit of A. Apparently, New York was unwilling to extend this rule to maritime policies for fear that New York companies would suffer competitive disadvantage, compared to other states.'*^ In addition to express indemnity contracts, indemnity is often implied into contractual relationships.'^® For example, if B employs C and C commits a tort against A within the scope of employment, A may sue B pursuant to respondeat superior, but C must indemnify B.*"^ An implied term of the employment contract between B and C is C's promise to indemnify B for the cost of ^ v 5. There is also indemnity implied in law. "This is a tort-based right to indemnification found when there is a great disparity in the fault of two tortfeasors, and one of the tortfeasors has paid for a loss that was primarily the responsibility of the other.'"'^ Indemnity implied in law was created at a time when contribution between joint tortfeasors was not allowed.'^^ In modem times, when contribution is accepted for negligent torts, indemnity implied in law appears to be simply an extreme form of contribution. Nevertheless, the distinction between this kind of indemnity and ordinary contribution persists. In New York, contribution is govemed by New York General Obligations Law section 15-108.50 In particular, section 15-108(c) provides: "A tortfeasor who has obtained his own release from liability shall not be entitled to contribution from any other person." Where B settles with A and then seeks indemnity from C, section 15-108(c) can be no impediment to indemnity, since indemnity is to be distinguished from contribution.^! Whenever C must indemnify B for A v B, Feldman payments may be made to provide the illusion that B has indeed paid A, thereby vesting 5's indemnity right against C. As we have seen,^^ the Feldman payment is a sham-^yet New York courts have knowingly approved of this sham in order to transform indemnity into liability. Obviously, the difference between paying A through a Feldman payment and simply declaring that A is always already the assignee of 5 as a matter of law is purely formal. The New York law of indemnity and contribution is now apparently that, if A takes care to set up a Feldman payment, B can recover from C and fund the payment to A. But if A simply takes a direct assignment of 5's right, neither nor 5 recovers anything.^^ Such mindless insistence on formality is unworthy of the law. Courts should declare that Feldman stands for the proposition that A is always already "paid" by an inherent assignment of 5's right against C over to A. Why make the parties go through the magic ritual of arranging for a paper payment? Nevertheless, courts do insist on the ritual. In Dicola v. American Steamship Owners Mutual Protection & Indemnity Ass'n (In re Prudential Lines, Inc.) ,^'* the Second Circuit acknowledged Feldman as part of New York law, but it uselessly insisted on a literal invocation of the required witchcraft. In Prudential Lines, C issued a "pay first" policy to B, covering up to $300,000 per tort. B also had numerous As whom B could not afford to pay. B's bankruptcy trustee lit upon the idea of paying Aj $300,000. Aj would then lend back this payment to B's estate, in exchange for a nonrecourse security interest against insurance proceeds. B would then use the proceeds of ^f's loan to pay A2, who would then lend back the proceeds for another nonrecourse security interest against insurance proceeds. This "recycling" process was repeated until the trustee owed $13 million in nonrecourse loans.
The Prudential Lines court ruled that Ai et al. were not really "paid." Therefore, C had no liability. It nevertheless held open the possibility that B could go back and try again. If B could borrow the funds from someone other than A in order to accomplish payment of all the As, the court seemed willing enough to allow Feldman payments to erase the distinction between indemnity and liability.^^ Presumably no harm was done, as B's bankruptcy trustee could, upon the second attempt, invoke the precise magic spells and voodoo incantations that Feldman stupidly requires.
In ruling that B had not paid A in Prudential Lines, the court distinguished the more sensible result in Liman v. American Steamship Owners Mutual Protection & Indemnity Ass 'n^^ In Liman, C issued a "pay first" policy to B with a $1,000 deductible per tort claimant. B had sufficient assets to pay all the As, but it also had to pay $1,000 to the As out of its own pocket. Other creditors claimed this was a preference.
The Liman court disagreed. It noted that, although A received a preferential $1,000, A returned this sum to B once B recovered from C and forwarded the proceeds to ^4. In effect B lent ^ $ 1,000 and A paid it back from proceeds later obtained (via B) from C. In contrast, in Prudential Lines B paid A and A lent that money back to B. In one case B was the lender and in the other A was the lender. Obviously the difference in cash flow was formal only, as no real cash ever changes hands in these recycling rituals.
The Prudential Lines court announced itself unbound from Liman. Liman, it appeared, involved the financing of the deductible, whereas Prudential Lines involved the funding of the whole claim. The purpose of the Liman deductible was simply to save C the bother of dealing with small claims. To arrange a paper transaction for a large claim in Prudential Lines did not therefore interfere with the purpose of the deductible. On the other hand, financing the whole claim meant that C's purpose would be defeated." And what was that purpose? Hiding like a coward behind J5's insolvency in order to leave the ^s uncompensated. This ignoble purpose should not be allowed. The very function of the Feldman payment is to prevent C from utilizing this strategy Nevertheless, the Prudential Lines court recognized Feldman as a valid statement of New York law.
We think Feldman is no help to Claimants here because the non party lender in Feldman performed a real financial service for a real financial reward, whereas the recycling of funds by the Trustee here is an illusion; and the obstacle removed in Feldman was a doctrine (Klinger) that was intended to protect plaintiffs but in the circumstances had backfired to that plaintiffs detriment, whereas the obstacle faced by Claimants here is a bargained for contract clause that protects an insurer unwilling to waive it.^^ The Prudential Lines court therefore required the presence of some third-party lender. Such a party will always be available and so no real harm was done. Indeed, in Prudential Lines itself, the court virtually invited B to try a Feldman scheme to arrange for C's liability.^® Wouldn't it be more elegant for courts to recognize that the meaning of Feldman is that A always already has a secured claim on 5 v C?^'
Looming over the entire Feldman scene is the intractable problem of worker's compensation. Suppose C employs A and A is injured by C 
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In Reich v. Manhattan Boiler & Equipment Corp.,^^ however, the New York Court of Appeals barred Feldman payments as a means of perfecting the contribution right, because the Feldman ruse was too subversive of the worker compensation system.^^ This opinion implies that C may hide behind the insolvency of B-in the name of workers' compensation. But where B is solvent and therefore has no need for the Feldman ritual. Dole implies that workers compensation does not protect C.
It is not clear, however, that Reich really protects C very much. Suppose that B has $100 in unencumbered assets and $500 in claims against it. ^'s tort judgment against B is precisely $100. Such a B would appear to be "solvent" enough to pay A without a Feldman payment. Reich, it would appear, has bite in the narrow circumstance where B has no assets at all.
II. LIABILITY
Where indemnity is the theory, B v Cis said to be contingent on B actually paying A. In such a case, Feldman payments are apparently necessary to transform indemnity into liability. But there is another, perhaps overlapping, theory. If C has committed a wrong against B- whether a tort or breach of contract-A's obligation to B is part of B's damages against C. Under the law of damages, proof that A has already been paid is not necessarily required. B is entitled to prove any future damage reasonably likely to occur. The fact that B has not yet paid A is irrelevant, so long as future payment is likely.^"'
The difference between fiiture damages and indemnity becomes a vital consideration for statute of limitations purposes. If the theory is indemnity, 5's cause of action accrues only when B, at her leisure, pays A.^^ But if tort or breach of contract is the standard, the action accrues at some earlier time.
People's Democratic Republic of Yemen v. Goodpasture, Inc.^'^ shows just how difficult this distinction can be. In Goodpasture, B arguably incurred a "deadfreight" expense to A in 1974 because C refused to deliver grain. B resisted paying the deadfreight but was finally compelled to pay in 1981. B then sued C for indemnification. The Goodpasture court ruled that B had no indemnity theory. Sales contracts under Article 2 of the UCC do not give rise to an implied duty to indemnify. Rather, B had only a claim for consequential breach-ofcontract damages which accrued when C became liable to A for deadfreight in 1974. Accordingly, the statute of limitations had run.'''' In other words, the court expected B to plead the deadfreight expense long before B actually paid it.
Accrual of a damage theory is fraught with metaphysical uncertainty. In Just as Feldman presages the transformation of indemnity into liability, courts have, not always wittingly, striven to make liability into indemnity. This instinct is often on display in the cases invoking an insurer's good faith duty to settle a case within the policy limit of the insured. For example, suppose C issues a liability policy to B. B injures A. C takes charge of the defense in A v B. A offers C a settlement for the amount of i5's insurance limit. C declines, figuring that if the jury clobbers B, it is B, not C, who will pay the price. Meanwhile, if the jury acquits B, then C owes nothing. C captures the upside of the jury trial and forces B to take the downside. As the court in Pinto v. Allstate Insurance CoP put it:
An insurer has an economic incentive not to settle, hoping a jury will bring in a verdict for less than the policy limits. But when such hope goes awry ... the insured is the loser, being personally responsible for the excess. These conflicting interests between the insurer and the insured cause them to mb against each other like unmoored rowboats on a placid pond.^^ In order to re-establish proper incentives in C, states commonly impose a tort duty on C for a bad faith duty to settle within the policy limits."^^ It often happens that, at the time of 5's tort against A, B is already insolvent. Whereas C may not gamble with B's money in refusing to settle, may C go ahead and gamble away when B has no money at all?
Courts are divided on the effect of 5's insolvency on C's good faith duty to settle. A leading case is Harris v. Standard Accident & Ins. Co.P in which B (already insolvent) negligently injured A with his car. B's insurance company (Q refused to settle. A jury returned a verdict far exceeding the insurance limit. C paid the policy amount, leaving A substantially underpaid. 5's bankruptcy trustee sued C for bad faith refusal to settle within the policy limits. The Harris Court ruled that, because B had been discharged in bankruptcy, B no longer had any obligation to pay A. Accordingly, the trustee could prove no damages against the insurance company.^"' If, on the other hand, B had net worth at the time of the accident, then, the Harris court emphasized, B's bankruptcy trustee could collect the full face value of yf's claim7® In such a case, total payment of A is necessary to reestablish the net worth. For example, if B's net worth prior to the accident was $20 and A's claim was $100, B can recover $100 from C, according to the Harris court. Any other result threatens 5's net worth. Suppose, for example, the court were to award only $20-the lost net worth. Then A, claiming $100, would obtain the $20 award, and B would still be insolvent. Only if ^ is paid off entirely is 5's net worth protected.
The starkest of all the cases in which B was insolvent at the time of A V B is Bourget v. Government Employees Insurance CoA^ In this case, B negligently injured A and killed himself to boot in an accident. B's estate consisted only of the insurance proceeds for J5'S car. This humble amount was entirely consumed by funeral expenses and 5's meager widow's allowance, which had priority over ^'s judgment.^' In light of B's death and the utter dissipation of B's estate, C refused to settle, and the jury awarded a judgment far in excess of policy limit. A Connecticut statute made A subrogee to 5's tort action against C for the tort of bad faith refusal to settle. In the name of B, A sued C, claiming C had unwisely gambled on a jury verdict. The Bourget comt held:
The basis for [the] duty to exercise good faith or due care with respect to opportunities to settle within the policy limits "is that the company has exclusive control over the decision conceming settlement within policy coverage, and company and insured often have conflicting interests as to whether settlement should be made . .
[WJhat gives rise to the duty and measures its extent is the conflict between the insurer's interest to pay less than the policy limits and the insured's interest not to suffer liability for any judgment exceeding them. In the rare instance where the insured has no such interest, there can be no conflict and the duty does not arise....
There could scarcely be a case where the insured's lack of interest in avoiding a judgment exceeding the policy limits was as clear as this one. [S] had no assets at all except his car. The insurance proceeds on this were completely consumed by claims to which Connecticut gave priority over [y4 's] . Satisfaction of [^'s] claim was thus unnecessary to pass even a small amount to [5's] heirs. Counsel's suggestion that some asset now unknown might fall into the estate at some future time ignores reality. Since [5] was killed, the threat of a judgment hanging over him was nil.®^
The court made clear that if there had been net worth of even a dollar, the result would have been different. The duty of an insurance company to settle within policy limits is cast in terms of the exercise of judgment. C is supposed to give equal weight to 5's welfare as well as C's own welfare. Yet, in Bourget, only A's welfare was at stake. Bourget could stand for the not unreasonable proposition that C owes its duty to settle to B alone, not to A. Where B lies in his grave after life's fitful fever, why shouldn't C gamble on victory, where no further malice domestic can be visited on BI In holding B undamaged when C caused 5's excess liability to A, the Harris and Bourget courts equated 5's very personhood with net worth. Where B had no net worth, B was in effect not a person. Such a view of personhood, however grounded in modem habits of civility, is untenable in law. Suppose, for example, that instead of refusing to settle with A, C instead steals, smashes or otherwise converts B's car to its own use. Presumably no court would hear C to claim B undamaged because the car would have gone to 5's creditors. Or, if C physically injures B and B incurs medical expenses, C could not argue that B was not really harmed, since any tort award would simply go to 5's creditors.
Furthermore, in our modem utilitarian age, it is usually alleged that the very purpose of tort law is to provide proper incentives for C to behave properly. A mle that denied the very personhood of insolvents would invite C to commit torts at will, so long as their consequences are calculated to visit insolvents only.
Corporate scholars discovered twenty years ago that a corporation is merely a "nexus of contracts."^'* The postmodern instinct is to view corporate existence as in no sense different from human personhood. Both are purely legal ideas. If a corporation is a nexus of contracts, then so is every human being. So viewed, every person is a fiduciary for his creditors. He is bound to use his human and financial capital and his very body to make sure that his creditors are paid. In harming any of these things, C stands as an obstacle to the performance of 5's fiduciary duty to her creditors. Accordingly, C should bear liability, even when the entire judgment goes to pay JB'S creditors.
But one need not rest on the undecidable metaphysics of personhood to show that Bourget and Harris are wrong. Although cases like Bourget present the strongest imaginable case for letting C off the hook because B is insolvent, nevertheless even 5's estate in Bourget could have made a Feldman payment. The beauty of secured lending is that even the poor can borrow, if they have collateral. And 5's estate always has collateral-^namely, BvC. In Bourget, X (A's lawyer) could have lent the amount of ^ v 5 to 5's estate. B's executor could have pledged 5 v C to Xas collateral. 5's administrator could then have used those fimds to pay A. A could have guaranteed Jfs repayment and could have posted the payment from 5's estate as collateral. 5's estate would then have generated an out-of-pocket loss that makes incontrovertible the fact that B has been damaged by Cs wrong. In short, just as Feldman tums indemnity into liability, it should stand against the instinct inherent in Harris and Bourget, to tum liability into indemnity.
Bourget and Harris aside, a majority of jurisdictions^^ hold that, in the good faith settlement environment, B may recover the face amount of A V B, even if A has not been paid.^® Even in New York, Harris and Bourget have been superseded in Pinto v. Allstate Insurance Co.,^' where B had "no assets."^^ The courts following the "liability" position give a variety of reasons for rejecting Harris and its ilk. For example, it is said that, where A has a judgment against B, this will follow 5 all 5's life, unless A is paid off. This very possibility of future harm justifies C's liability where A has not yet been paid.^^ "An insured may be damaged by the effect on his credit of an outstanding claim where he cannot pay it."^" This instinct has been extended to cases where B has been killed in the course of injuring A, since 5's death should not adhere to C's benefit.^' A better view of the matter, however, is that no matter how insolvent or dead B is, the estate of B always has the power to borrow the funds needed to pay A. Given the mere possibility of secured lending, courts should simply erase the distinction between indemnity and liability. But this raises the possibility that B will already be discharged in a bankruptcy proceeding before A is actually paid. How does bankruptcy discharge affect Feldmanl I take this question up in the next section.
III. BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGE
The Harris rule invites C to hide like a coward behind the skirts of B's insolvency in order to avoid its tort liability. The Harris court implied that B's discharge in bankruptcy had something to do with this.^2 That is to say, given the fact of 5's discharge, B owes A nothing and therefore C has not damaged BP There are a great many reasons why this suggestion must be rejected. First, the implication of Harris contradicts at least the spirit of Bankruptcy Code § 524(e): "[ejxcept as provided in subsection (a)(3) of this section, discharge of a debt of the debtor does not affect the liability of any other entity on, or property of any other entity for, such debt."^'' Superficially, this section may not seem to implicate the Harris facts, where C tortiously injured B by causing A v B. Section 524(e) applies only if C is liable for B's debt (as where C is a surety). In Harris, C owed nothing to A for the debt of B. Rather, C was a tortfeasor that owed a duty to B only.
But suppose, following my thesis, that A is deemed the secured creditor of B, with 5 v C as her collateral. On this premise, it can be seen that § 524(e) applies quite directly. C is liable directly to A because, according to what I have suggested, A is the assignee of 5 v C. The meaning of § 524(e) is that C may make no reference to 5's discharge from AvB asa reason why C should not have to pay Bv C.
There are other reasons to think that Harris embodies an incorrect concept of discharge. According to pre-Code law, bankruptcy discharge was conceived as preventing the remedy without denying the existence of the debt itself. According to the Supreme Court in Kessler v.
Department of Public Safety?^
[A] discharge does not free the bankmpt from all traces of the debt, as though it had never been incurred. This Court has held that a moral obligation to pay the debt survives discharge and is sufficient to permit a State to grant recovery to the creditor on the basis of a promise subsequent to discharge, even though the promise is not supported by new consideration. The theory, the Court declared, is that "the discharge destroys the remedy but not the indebtedness" ...
What Kessler implies is that debts exist after they have been discharged.^^ Accordingly, B can make a Feldman payment to A even after B is discharged. Discharge, then, is never an excuse for C to assert B\ insolvency as a reason for not paying, whether the underlying theory is indemnity or liability.
The Kessler principle is largely forgotten today because § 524(c) prohibits any contract to affirm a discharged debt unless the agreement pre-dates the discharge itself and the court has approved the reaffirmation agreement.
Nevertheless, the Kessler principle is legislated directly into the Bankruptcy Code itself, in a passage rarely cited and little noticed. According to Bankruptcy Code § 524(f), "[njothing contained in subsection (c) or (d) of this section prevents a debtor from voluntarily repaying any debt." Section 524(f) expresses the ancient notion that discharged debts are still debts, and they can be paid.^^ A historic discharge, then, should have no effect on a Feldman The law of composition was that discharge was contingent on the debtor paying the agreed-upon consideration. Accordingly, the mere fact of the composition could not mean that the debt had disappeared. It continued to exist, even after the composition agreement was exercised. 
strategy.
Even if KessleEs view of discharge is ignored, we have already seen that discharge constitutes an injunction against debt enforcement, but this injunction can be lifted for the benefit of A. Courts have even insisted that the injunction be lifted, or that non-bankruptcy courts simply ignore the discharge for the purpose of establishing a judgment in A V B, provided this judgment is enforced against C only.^^ These cases fully apply in any indemnity or liability case with regard to Feldman payments. And if Feldman payments are possible and easy to achieve, then courts should simply lay to rest the very distinction between indemnity and liability whenever B is insolvent. Or, even if they insist on seeing the Feldman ritual actually performed, discharge provides no reason why this voodoo ritual should not be performed.
Finally, if courts recognize that A has a lien on 5 v C, then A's claim against B is not discharged but rather constitutes a nonrecourse secured claim against B. The Supreme Court itself has affirmed that creditors rendered nonrecourse by discharge of 5's personal liability are nevertheless creditors of 5.""' If A is conceived as B's nonrecourse creditor claiming 5 v C as collateral, then A can still be "paid," for indemnity or liability purposes. It therefore follows that bankruptcy discharge cannot possibly serve to shield C's liability to A, who is inherently the assignee of 5 v C.
IV. ASSIGNMENT AND RELEASE
If liability, not indemnity, is the theory, B's insolvency can never shield C from liability for the simple reason that B can assign B v C over to AI^^ Liability, of course, turns on the ability to prove that future damages are more likely than not to occur. That is, B must prove that A is likely to be paid. Yet when B assigns B v C over to A, payment of A is absolutely certain to occur, and this element of B's case is proven by the very fact of the assignment.
Commonly, B assigns B v C io A in exchange for /I's release of B 5ee jM/7ra text accompanying notes 19-22. '00 Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78 (1991). In Johnson, a debtor with a mortgaged farm filed for chapter 7 and received a discharge. He then filed a subsequent chapter 13 case, where he hoped to cram down the secured creditor in a reorganization plan. The secured creditor responded that, because of the discharge, it was no longer a "creditor" and was therefore immune from cram down. The Supreme Court rejected this claim. Id.
Many courts permit a debtor to reinstate security agreements after chapter 7 discharges. Capital Communications Fed. Credit Union v. Boodrow {In re Boodrow), 126 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 1997). These cases, too, assume that payment of the nonrecourse secured party constitutes a genuine "payment" that prevents the conclusion that the security agreement is in default.
from any further liability. In the context of an insurance company's good faith duty to settle A v B within 5's policy limit, many courts have ruled that B may validly assign B v Cto A, m exchange for 's release of 5.102
But if A has released B in exchange for this assignment, does this not mean that B v C has no value, because 5's release portends that B has no liability to A and was therefore not damaged? At least one court has so concluded. In Pemo v. For-Med Medical Group, P.C.,io3 the court viewed A's release as proof that B v C had evaporated, thereby defeating the assignment which B executed in exchange for the release. In Pemo, C was a trio of doctors who allegedly committed malpractice. B was the medical group that employed C. A was a victim of C's malpractice. A had a respondeat superior cause of action against B, which had an indemnity right against C.
After A brought her claim against B, B filed for bankruptcy. B assigned its indemnity right against C to A "expressly renounceft'io^ any bankruptcy dividend from B. The court ruled that A had "released" B from liability, thereby foreclosing 5's claim for indemnity.'"5
The Perno court must be criticized-and severely so-for imposing a harsh trick on A and B that they could hardly have expected. Obviously, B intended to "pay" A by assigning to A the proceeds of 5 v C. In effect, A agreed to be a nonrecourse creditor with a claim of an asset of B. A and B were not seeking to enrich C.
If a Feldman payment had been made in Pemo, the court would have been compelled to recognize that BvC was a valuable right which A could validly collect. Why should such a bad result follow just because this ritual was not performed?'"^ In fact, the assignment in Perno should have been analyzed as follows. Since B assigned to A in exchange for a release, the assignment should be deemed an "asset pajonent"-that is, a transfer of an asset in satisfaction of a debt. Ordinarily, one thinks of "payment" as the transfer of United States currency. But there is no reason why some other asset might not satisfy a debt. In chapter 11 bankruptcies, asset payments are even common.'O'' For example, where a debtor has mortgaged premises to a secured creditor, the debtor might write a plan that deeds the equity to the secured creditor in satisfaction of the secured claim. "W^en this occurs, the creditor has received an "asset payment."^"^ Similarly, in Perno, A was paid by means of B's asset. The asset in question was BvC. True, 5 v C is valuable only if A has been paid. The very assignment to A should accomplish A's payment. Or, in liability (as opposed to indemnity) terms, the assignment proves that A is certain to be paid, thereby establishing the value ofBvC.
To look at it from another perspective, suppose, in Perno, that B had granted a lien to A on B v C, in exchange for a release. In this transaction A has not been "paid"-only "secured." A would then be a nonrecourse creditor of B. Non-recourse creditors of B are still creditors.io^ Certainly a Feldman payment could be made to vest 5's indemnity right against C.
If a secured transaction is a valid way to vest A with the right to collect from C, then how sensible is it to bar the asset payment version of the deal? Perno, then, must be rejected as a cruel hoax on A that is by no means theoretically required.'i"
V. THE NEED FOR 5'S VOLUNTARY ACT
The Perno decision aside, courts seem willing enough to honor the directly,! or B can do so, as fiduciary for Section 2-722 "is designed to overturn the rule prevailing in some jurisdictions that only one party could hold title to goods, and only that party had standing to sue a third party for damage to the goods."'
Where section 2-722 applies, A is deemed to be the assignee of 5 v C. Accordingly, whether J or B is the plaintiff, neither needs to prove a pre-existing payment to A in order to recover. It is precisely this instinct that I argue must apply in any indemnity or liability case, where B is insolvent.
CONCLUSION
In this article, I have argued that the New York courts have abrogated the distinction between indemnity and liability. Where B owes A and C owes B, and where the payment of A is the condition precedent to B v C, B is invited to enter into a secured transaction which allows for the payment of A without any real transfer of capital. Given that this illusion is fully permitted, it is time for the courts to confess that the distinction between indemnity and liability is a false one that should be entirely erased. 
